Doctor Who?
BBC World 15.09.2008 have an article about a potential mood-swing against Georgia in the EU:
In a potentially significant swing of expert Western opinion, a leading British think tank has urged that Nato membership should not be granted to Georgia or Ukraine. "The policy of Nato enlargement now would be a strategic error," said Dr John Chipman, Director General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "There is no case for accelerating membership for Georgia and Ukraine. There is a strong case for a pause," he said in remarks introducing the IISS's annual review of world affairs, the Strategic Survey.
The IISS is highly critical of Georgian actions - in contrast to the support Georgia has received from the US and some European countries, notably Britain. Naturally, if Georgia is faulted, then less blame can be put on Russia, whatever its reaction or, as some hold, its over-reaction.Dr Chipman said that the "balance of evidence suggests that Georgia started this war".
The IISS is highly critical of Georgian actions - in contrast to the support Georgia has received from the US and some European countries, notably Britain. Naturally, if Georgia is faulted, then less blame can be put on Russia, whatever its reaction or, as some hold, its over-reaction.Dr Chipman said that the "balance of evidence suggests that Georgia started this war".
Cogito ergo sum
In order to blame anyone for starting the conflict obne need to look at the timeline and how Russia planned the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia years ago. But does it even matter? Isn’t the question more “Should Russia be allowed to occupy a souvereign country?” Should ethnic cleansing be rewarded with silent approval from the EU? Isn’t the question how to deal with the aggressor Russia in the future, especially in the Arktis, in the Baltics in Crimea, Moldova and in the South America to mention some? As for who started the war: The Russians started it several years ago by provocations, ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, troop build-up in Abkhazia, armouring of the separatists in both rebel regions, airspace violations, economical sanctions, presecution of Georgians in Russia, among other things, and is only a clear sign of Russias modus operandi in future conflicts. I also want to urge Dr. Chipman to spend a couple of extra hours in his tank wondering why Putin increases Russias defence budget with 27% next year.
Descartes stated: ”I think, therefore I am”. For think-tank Chairman Chipman it obviously might be more appropriate to say: "I think in a tank, therefore I am a bit limited".
In order to blame anyone for starting the conflict obne need to look at the timeline and how Russia planned the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia years ago. But does it even matter? Isn’t the question more “Should Russia be allowed to occupy a souvereign country?” Should ethnic cleansing be rewarded with silent approval from the EU? Isn’t the question how to deal with the aggressor Russia in the future, especially in the Arktis, in the Baltics in Crimea, Moldova and in the South America to mention some? As for who started the war: The Russians started it several years ago by provocations, ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, troop build-up in Abkhazia, armouring of the separatists in both rebel regions, airspace violations, economical sanctions, presecution of Georgians in Russia, among other things, and is only a clear sign of Russias modus operandi in future conflicts. I also want to urge Dr. Chipman to spend a couple of extra hours in his tank wondering why Putin increases Russias defence budget with 27% next year.
Descartes stated: ”I think, therefore I am”. For think-tank Chairman Chipman it obviously might be more appropriate to say: "I think in a tank, therefore I am a bit limited".
posted by Eistein G. at 4:01 pm
6 Comments:
In a week of extraordinary events, Friday’s 30 per cent bounce in Russia’s stock market ranks with the best of them. The $130bn support package stitched together during Moscow’s two-day market shutdown achieved its immediate goal. But, like the bigger crisis 10 years ago, Russia’s crash of 2008 has long-term implications.
First, it punctured the conceit that Moscow can soon become a global financial centre. The market plunge exposed deep cracks in its financial infrastructure. Russia must deepen its domestic capital pool, accelerate moves to get pension funds into equities, and develop its retail investment market. It must cultivate properly functioning domestic bank lending so that businesses can finance themselves on competitive terms. And it must ensure future central bank liquidity injections are more efficiently disbursed into the financial system.
Second, the crisis has highlighted that Russia is hardwired into the global economy. It cannot escape external factors such as dollar or oil price shifts. And a confrontational foreign policy has had a cost in terms of battered confidence and capital flight. That may restrain future aggression. Above all, Russia wants a seat at the top table of world affairs – but its claim to one relies on having a big enough economy.
There may be another restraint: the oligarchs. Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper. Recent military adventurism undermined that grand bargain. Lower commodity prices and slowing growth will make it even trickier to sustain. Oligarchs have been hit hard by the market fall; the rescue package came only after a restive business elite complained to the Kremlin.
Vladimir Putin’s entrenched power makes more vigorous opposition highly risky. But, after the recent jolt, oligarch loyalty is no longer a given.
Let us looks at the 130 billion. That is roughly one quarter of all the reserves that Russia had accumulated over the last few years and they had to spend it over a few days to prop up the market. Most of the money they spent to boost the stock market is now likely safe in foreign bank accounts. A few more bad weeks and the reserves will be gone. Then, what will Russia do?
“Should Russia be allowed to occupy a souvereign country?” Should ethnic cleansing be rewarded with silent approval from the EU?
Moscow's miscalculated show of strength
Monday, September 22, 2008
ANDREAS UMLAND
In Western comments, the Russian army's invasion of Georgia is portrayed as a manifestation of revisionist expansionism. Kremlin-controlled mass media, in contrast, presents Russia's intervention in the Southern Caucasus as a humanitarian action saving a national minority from genocide as well as the lives and dignity of Russian citizens abroad. After what the Russian army had done to Chechnya in the 1990s, Moscow's noise on Georgia is not only hyperbolic and -critical. The Russian leadership helped also to provoke the Georgian attack and had been seemingly waiting or even preparing for it. Yet, the Russian interpretation of the August 2008 events is valid, to a certain extent, too. Had Russia not intervened, the number of dead, wounded and fleeing Ossetians may have been higher. Tiblisi's behavior toward Ossetians under Georgia's first President Zviad Gamzakhurdia, in the early 1990s, did not bode well for Saakashvili's methods to solve this separatist issue.
A third factor, however, was more or even the most relevant. With her demonstrative unilateralism in the Caucasus, Russia intended to signal to the United States that she is back. Her actions were meant as a response to and replication of American international behavior on the Balkans and Islamic world, after the end of the Cold War. Having regained economic and military power, Moscow, with her action, communicated to Washington: In our backyard' (i.e. the former Soviet republics), we can do the same as you did in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq. Perhaps, we are not on a pair with you in world politics. But, in our sphere of influence, we are again a Great Power, and will behave accordingly.
People in the West may not only doubt whether the pre-history, circumstances and effects of the United States' and Russia's recent military interventions and foreign policies are easily comparable. Many Westerners might be surprised that they themselves are addressees of Russia's recent over-reaction in the Caucasus. Yet, this is exactly the case.
Ambiguous reaction of Eurasia
For several years now, Russia's tightly controlled world news reporting and foreign affairs commenting have been dominated by shrill anti-Americanism. Whether on popular TV shows or in high-brow journals, Russia is presented as the negative other of the US its major counterweight both politically and culturally, on the Euro-Asian continent. Russia appears as the last defender of an alternative Eurasian civilization marked by traditional beliefs, historical rootedness, high culture, and spiritual values. Russian official discourse on current international affairs is fixated on open and hidden U.S. influence abroad, which is seen as standing behind almost everything that is happening in the world today. While there are many good Europeans sharing, at least partially, this view, there is also the bad West comprised of those countries that are, in fact, satellites of the amerikantsy.
It was this obsession with the United States' role in contemporary history that led Russia's leaders not only to interpret Georgia's attack on South Ossetia in conspiratorial terms, i.e. to understand Saakashvili's behavior as inspired by Washington. The Russian leaders' inferiority complex with regard to U.S. power, apparently, also resulted in inattention to possible effects that their sharp response to Tiblisi's inapt actions would have on countries' good relations to which are seen as being of importance to Russia, by much of her elite. Russia's resolute show of strength was primarily intended for the American spectator and did have the effect on U.S. political and intellectual leaders that Moscow had been anticipating or even hoping for.
Kremlin's propaganda bubble
Yet, in Europe and the former Soviet empire, it had considerable impact too. There, the repercussions took a form that has, probably, been less welcome to Russia's elites. Depressingly, some of Russia's politically and culturally closest allies in the post-Soviet sphere too reacted with suspicious ambivalence. Most remaining member countries of the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States have kept silent until now, or, like Ukraine, do not come up with a unified position of its political elites. Interestingly, Kazakhstan perhaps, Russia's most important ally in Central Asia did, so far, not speak up for the Russian position either. Even Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenka had to be reminded of his obligations toward Moscow by the Russian Ambassador in Minsk, before he duly called the invasion of Georgia wonderful. Oddly, it was Nicaragua a country of marginal relevance to Russia's interests that first followed Moscow in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states. Russia now runs the risk that the relative unimportance, in both regional and international terms, of the countries who follow Russia in supporting diplomatically the two separatist republics will have the effect of illustrating the dubiousness of the issue rather than actually strengthen Moscow's position on the international scene.
Like numerous times before, the Russian leadership appears as a prisoner to its own propaganda. Moscow's leaders, of course, know that most information on political matters spread by Russian media and officials is, at best, filtrated, and, at worst, falsified. Yet, they continue becoming hostages of the aggressive public discourse evolving out of this manipulated factual basis. The results recall Russia's inadequate reaction to the fall of Milosevic or the Orange Revolution, and her subsequent loss of influence in Serbia and Ukraine nations historically close to the Russians. The conduct of Moscow's leaders' foreign policy falls victim to the archaic political order they have created in post-Soviet Russia, in the first place. What, so far, is saving the Russian leaders from manifest domestic embarrassment is that media reports on the obvious mishaps of Russian foreign policy are also manipulated. A plethora of marginal statements by non-Russians supporting Moscow's behavior in the Caucasus is extensively documented on Russian TV while Europe's stiff position and the former Soviet republics' lack of support remains uncommented or even unreported in Russian mass media. However, outside the Kremlin's propagandist bubble, Moscow looks increasingly isolated a perception that, sooner or later, will also find its way to the Russian public.
Dr Andreas Umland is editor of the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society"
So Medvedev's rise is good news for relations between Russia and the West. Yet it could also complicate Russia's domestic development and foreign policies. Western leaders will have to be prudent about supporting pro-democratic changes initiated by Medvedev while not undermining his authority in Russia. Russian public opinion and especially the discourse of Moscow's elite have become so anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, that demonstrative support by the West weakens rather than strengthens politicians here.
Andreas Umland
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/10/AR2007121001560.html
Dear Andreas. Thank you for letting us read your article.I have made some comments.
”Yet, the Russian interpretation of the August 2008 events is valid, to a certain extent, too. Had Russia not intervened, the number of dead, wounded and fleeing Ossetians may have been higher.”
No. Here I think you are wrong. I followed the events from Tbilisi in july/august, and it was evident that something was going to happen. I wrote on this blog already in july 11. that there was going to be war with Russia. That was on basis of all the Russian provocations, and that the South Ossetian separatists started to attack Georgian officials with radioguided bombs. There was also an assasination attempt on the Georgia-friendly ”president”. Following the media coverage from both Russian and Georgian TV channels the bulid up before the final confrontation was formidable. Had Russia not ordered the South Ossetian separatists to start the turmoil so Russia could ”intervene” there would have been lives saved.
”A third factor, however, was more or even the most relevant. With her demonstrative unilateralism in the Caucasus, Russia intended to signal to the United States that she is back. Her actions were meant as a response to and replication of American international behavior on the Balkans and Islamic world, after the end of the Cold War.”
I view this as only as a ”bonus” for Russia. The main task, as I see it was to annex Abkhazia in order to secure the Black Sea territory and create a secure zone for the Sochi 2014 Olympics. They have already invested, according to the Abkhaz official website amounts of 200 mill dollars in 2007, large amounts of money in Abkhaziqa. The railroad that was build in 2008 trasports military equipment in to Abkhazia and buildingmaterial from Abkhazia to Sochi.
”Many Westerners might be surprised that they themselves are addressees of Russia's recent over-reaction in the Caucasus. Yet, this is exactly the case.”
Agree on that one.
”Russian official discourse on current international affairs is fixated on open and hidden U.S. influence abroad, which is seen as standing behind almost everything that is happening in the world today.”
This is natural, because the perverted Hobbsianism lying behind the philosophy of Souverign Democracy needs an external enemy in order to function; disciplining the population.
”Interestingly, Kazakhstan perhaps, Russia's most important ally in Central Asia did, so far, not speak up for the Russian position either.”
No but they have cancelled two major developing contracts within Georgia. I guess thats something that Putin would aprove of.
”Yet, they continue becoming hostages of the aggressive public discourse evolving out of this manipulated factual basis.”
Definitely agree on that one. Therefore they also lost the mediawar early. Caught in numerous lies.
”A plethora of marginal statements by non-Russians supporting Moscow's behavior in the Caucasus is extensively documented on Russian TV[ ..]”
Yes and they are right. The impression left behind to most Norwegian citizens from western media, is that Russia defended them selvf, Saakashvili is crazy and that US was behind it all. A pretty normal response considering the extremely poor and knowledgless reporting from most newspapers and TV channels in Norwy. BBC World and CNN was consistent, though. But most Norwegians don’t bother to look at those channels.
”So Medvedev's rise is good news for relations between Russia and the West. Yet it could also complicate Russia's domestic development and foreign policies. Western leaders will have to be prudent about supporting pro-democratic changes initiated by Medvedev while not undermining his authority in Russia.”
I see your point, but Medvedev is at the moment Putins mouthpiece. I think I have to see to believe in this case.
At the end of September, Russian state television broadcast a half-hour "special report" that charged foreign intelligence services, particularly the CIA, as using Russian nongovernmental organizations to foment dissent. The broadcast was eerily reminiscent of similar "special reports" that appeared on Serbian state television during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic. And the purpose of the broadcast was the same -- to mobilize a frightened society against shadowy external "enemies."
Such crass propaganda is just one of many similarities between the authoritarian regimes of Milosevic and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Both leaders began their rule by establishing iron control over the media, while carefully leaving the small B92 radio station in Belgrade and Russia's Ekho Moskvy in order to create an illusion of media freedom. But for the majority, freedom of the press was reduced to freedom to praise the leader.
Milosevic secured his position by sidelining his predecessor, Ivan Stambolic, who was later killed by a professional assassin, possibly at Milosevic's behest. Likewise, Putin has turned his sights on many of those who contributed to his rise to power, particularly former oligarch Boris Berezovsky, whom he hounded out of the country and stripped of his lucrative business interests in Russia.
Both Milosevic and Putin used the crushing of separatist movements -- in Kosovo and Chechnya -- to boost their popularity. But while Kosovo now seems on the verge of gaining independence thanks to strong international support, a brutal strongman and a mafia-type regime have been installed in Chechnya to keep a lid on the simmering conflict there.
The two leaders also displayed a profound understanding of the techniques of staying in power by manipulating both their supporters and their opponents. In Milosevic's Serbia, the Yugoslav Union of Leftists (headed by Milosevic's wife) was created to siphon off support from the left, while the Serbian Radical Party was set up to take votes from the right.
Putin has followed the same pattern -- stamping out real opposition parties and creating controlled front organizations to weaken the Communist Party and the liberal-democratic opposition. A Just Russia, Civic Force, and Great Russia were all created by the Kremlin to confuse voters from, respectively, the left, center, and right of the political spectrum. All these parties in both countries benefited from the state's control of the media, especially television.
At the recent parliamentary elections in Russia, Putin's supporters managed to achieve a 104 percent turnout in Mordovia. By coincidence or not, Milosevic's supporters were equally enthusiastic -- they managed to reach exactly the same figure in one Serbian municipality.
Strong Nationalism, Weak Institutions
Neither Milosevic nor Putin espoused a particular ideology beyond a vague sort of statist nationalism. Milosevic was the leader of the Serbs, not of Serbia. By the same token, Putin acts as the leader of the Russians, rather than as the head of the multiethnic Russian Federation. Under both leaders, nationalism grew steadily, often with ugly manifestations.
Nor did either leader do much to build the complex institutions needed for a modern state. In both states, to take just the most glaring example, the legislature was completely marginalized and subordinated to the executive branch -- that is, to Milosevic and Putin personally.
As a result of years of stage-managed elections and rubber stamping, Russians have come to rate parliament as the least-powerful political institution in the country, according to a recent Levada Center poll. Another poll by the same research agency found that more than one-third of Russians believe Russia does not need a legislature at all.
Power has been personalized under Putin just as it was under Milosevic, and the structure described in both countries' constitutions was de facto replaced by a hidden power structure centered on the two leaders. When Milosevic switched positions, power stayed with him; Putin too is set to retain real power even after his second presidential term ends next year. He has just been asked to take the prime minister's position.
Other domestic similarities between Milosevic and Putin include the manipulation of youth groups, the promotion of Orthodox Christianity as part of their nationalist vision, co-opting a loyal group of rich businesspeople to press the state's political goals by "commercial" means, and even, in some cases, resorting to criminal means, including murder, to achieve political ends.
Divisive Figures
They are also both belligerent and divisive figures on the international stage. Milosevic was skilled at exploiting divisions within the European Union and manipulating unpopular aspects of U.S. foreign policy for his own ends. Putin has followed this example perfectly.
The prime-time "special report" aired in September asserted that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was nothing but a bid to steal that country's oil, adding that now Washington has set itself the goal of dismembering Russia and taking control of its natural resources. Russian Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev similarly told a mass-market weekly two months ago that the United States and Great Britain are waging a concerted campaign to weaken Russia, using the security services of Poland, Georgia, and the Baltic states.
History offers few examples of authoritarian rulers who have voluntarily transformed their countries into democracies, although many have claimed to be doing so. A regime that bases its support on the fear of external enemies and their purported domestic agents inevitably comes to rely on the security services, the army, and the police. Democratic institutions and all manifestations of pluralism wither and disappear.
And history further shows that releasing the genie of nationalism is far easier than putting it back in the bottle. The legacies of Milosevic's nationalistic campaigns are still being felt in the Balkans. Last week, more than a million people in Serbia signed a request to have live television coverage of the trial of Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian radical nationalist, at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. It is daunting to think what the ultimate consequences of Putin's Great Russianism might be. Russian commentator Aleksei Pankin predicted recently that Putin's legacy of stability and authoritarianism will last for five or 10 years. "After that, the Russian people will probably grow tired of stability once again and will try -- as they did in 1917 and 1992 -- to build paradise on Earth."
Nenad Pejic
Thank you, Mr Pejic for a very intersting comparison of Putin and Milosevic!
Hi Nenad,
Intereseting parallelism you have pointed out.
There are, unfortunately, some major differences to remember:
Russia has muscles (nuclear weapon), econimic leverage (oil, gas) and powerful friends (Germany, France etc).
With regards
For the better future
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